Purpose -Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to economic and human developments amid growing emphasis on IPRs (with recent advances in ICTs) and good governance. In the first empirical study on the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa, we examine how a plethora of factors (IPRs laws, education & ICTs and government quality) are instrumental in the piracy-inequality nexus.
Introduction
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to African economic and human developments (Asongu, 2012a) . It has also become abundantly clear that, for any country, region or continent to be actively involved in the global economy, it must adopt competition as a benchmark to progress. Competition derives from intellectual capital, which is protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs) laws (treaties). In recent economic history, there has been a wide consensus on the key role that IPRs protection play in promoting innovation processes and economic growth. Much recently however, technological progress has not only brought about an increased availability of information and technology products, but also the proliferation of technology used to copy, unlawfully download or counterfeit such commodities. Given present efforts being placed on harmonizing the standard and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide (Asongu, 2012b) , whereas much has been debated about the incidence of IPRs on economic development in developing countries, the incomeredistributive role of piracy has remained unexplored in the literature.
Hitherto, much of the debate has centered on IPRs protection. While some scholars have postulated that increased IPRs stimulates growth and economic development through the rewarding impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006) , others are of the position that IPRs protection and adherence to international treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001 ). This skeptical strand is of the view that less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the shortterm) for developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for growth and development. According to their thesis, the existing technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and not suitable for the creation of new innovations.
The debate on HIV/AID drugs best illustrates this second stance and adds motivation to the current paper 1 .
In light of the above debate, there is increasing relevance of the impact of IPRs protection on promotion of innovation, technological advancements and economic development. Still, whereas theoretical literature has addressed the issue to some extent, little scholarly attention has been devoted to empirical literature. The existing bulk of empirical studies has examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright industries (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006ab; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012) . As far as we know, there is very scanty evidence on the piracy-inequality nexus. Andrés (2006a) , a study closest to the present paper in the literature, has assessed the incidence of inequality on piracy in a 'developed-countries' focused framework. The present study steers clear of Andrés (2006a) from a number of dimensions (as will be discussed subsequently) and aims to examine the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa. Results could provide the much needed policy guidance, given the growing concerns on IPRs, governance and poverty in the continent. This paper's contribution to the existing quantitative literature is threefold. Firstly, as far as we have reviewed, it is the first empirical study to assess the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa. Secondly, the piracy-inequality nexus is contingent on the upholding of IPRs. In other words, it examines how IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumental in the incomeinequality nexus. Thirdly, given current efforts that have been devoted to fighting piracy in the continent, the study also assesses how governance mechanisms are instrumental in the effect of piracy on inequality. The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner.
Section 2 examines existing literature. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.
Literature review

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and development
There are two main avenues along which intellectual property and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to influence the level of economic growth and development (Bezmen & Depken, 2004) . The first strand captures the extent to which IPRs affect the creation of new knowledge and information within nations, as well as the diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second strand is focused on the indirect effect of a nation's IPRs regime on international transactions that provide factors necessary for the growth process.
In the first strand on 'creation and dissemination of information', IPRs protection draws from the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth whereby, investment in research and development (R&D) rewards individual investors with profit (returns) and also augment society's stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future innovation improves the accumulation of knowledge for economic prosperity (Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991) . The underlying wisdom of tighter IPRs regimes (with stricter adherence to IPRs) is based on the notion that, protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by motivating innovations and inventions. The recent tendency by many newly industrialized countries pushing for stronger IPRs through bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements, point to the interest of developing countries to specialize in labor intensive production in agricultural industries. Until very recently, these industries have largely been supported by public expenditures on R & D and technology, and have greatly benefited from shared knowledge spillovers.
The second strand looks at how IPRs can affect a nation's growth and development process through their influence on a nation's ability to engage in international transactions such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, trade and technology transfers (Bezmen & Depken, 2004) . International trade has been presented by endogenous growth theories as an important stimulus to economic prosperity, as access to world markets could spur greater utilization of human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003) , and facilitate the transmission of technology by providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of domestic resources towards more research intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not necessarily predict that openness has contributed to economic growth in all countries under all circumstances;
principally because, theoretical prediction depends on country-specific conditions. It has been substantially documented that stronger IPRs regimes are crucial in attracting the inflows of FDI and technology transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996) , stimulating exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and increasing the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996) . On the other hand, stronger IPRs protection could mitigate the need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001 ).
Piracy and inequality in Africa
As presented in Table 1 below, in addition to being one of the poorest regions in the world, Africa is also the world's most inequitable region after Latin America. Inequalities have not substantially diminished overtime. Accordingly, in 2010, six out of ten most unequal countries worldwide were in Sub-Saharan African and more specifically in Southern Africa (African Development Bank: AfDB, 2012). The continent accounts for a substantial portion of the world's people living in absolute poverty. Its share of the world's poor rose from below 20% to the neighborhood of 25% and nearly 50% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than one US$ a day today: the world's highest rate of extreme poverty.
According to the AfDB, with the richest capturing the largest share of income, when measured by share of income that goes to the poorest, inequalities are striking; especially with geographic disparities between urban and rural areas where the poor are concentrated. Africa, the level of piracy is averagely in the neighborhood of 80%. Indeed, software piracy in Africa has reached an epidemic level (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu, 2012bcd (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) , intellectual property rights (IPRs) protections channels that matter in the battle (Asongu, 2012cd) and, feasible timeframes for the harmonization of IPRs against the scourge (Asongu, 2012b) . With growing levels in African income inequality, it is of policy relevance to assess whether current efforts in the fight against piracy are pro-poor or not.
Piracy, IPRs protection and quality of institutions in Africa
In light of the staggering statistics presented in Table 1 above, substantial efforts are being devoted to effectively tackle the rising phenomenon (IDC, 2009; El-Bialy, 2010; Fripp, 2011; Blakeney and Mengistie, 2011; AFROL, 2012; Agabi, 2012) . This section will be discussed in two main strands. The first will complement the statistics in Table 1 with glaring stylized facts on software piracy in selected African countries while the second will focus on the role of institutional measures in combating the growing phenomenon.
In order to better understand the growing importance of piracy in Africa, we shall present stylized facts from selected African countries that best illustrate the situation, notably:
Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt. Firstly, consistent with Agabi (2012) , software developers are losing millions of naira annually to software thefts. The phenomenon is negatively affecting Nigeria's economy and business experts are consistent with the position that, the issue of illegal software in the country is a serious one and an urgent solution is necessary because software usage is expected to increase over the coming years. Secondly, the Kenya Copyright
Board is currently beefing-up its efforts in the fight against piracy. Accordingly, it is reported that, the board planned to battle it with vigor in 2012 in order to increase investment potential and crackdown on illegal use of software (Fripp, 2011 (Fripp, 2011). institutions differ significantly from those prevailing in rich countries. For example, Rodrik (2008) has qualified them as 'second-best institutions' and described the institutional reforms promoted by multilateral organizations as being heavily biased towards a best-practice approach.
The existing bulk of empirical studies has examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright industries (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006ab; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012) . As far as we know, there is very scanty evidence on the piracyinequality nexus. Andrés (2006a) , a study closest to the present paper in the literature, has assessed the incidence of inequality on piracy. The results show that economic inequality has a negative incidence on national rates of piracy. The present study steers clear of Andrés (3) the incidence of piracy on inequality is assessed and not the other way round.
Data and methodology
Data
Dependent and independent variables
The proxy for inequality is the GINI coefficient which appreciates disparity among values of the frequency income-distribution. A value of zero expresses perfect equality while a coefficient of one represents maximal inequality. As recently documented (Senadza, 2012; De Silva, 2013) , the GINI coefficient which is commonly used as a measure of inequality in income or wealth has found application in diverse disciplines investigating inequality: sociology, economics, health science, agriculture…etc.
The measure for piracy is the software piracy rate, which is defined as "the unauthorized copying of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal use" (SIIA, 2000) . Software piracy may potentially take many avenues -e.g., organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business piracy.
Hence, obtaining an accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge in the literature. There are many types of piracy. According to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading and; 3) counterfeiting. The level of piracy is computed as the difference in demand for new software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. In the present, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) on an annual basis and is taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is reported in percentages, scaling from 0 % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is of pirated origin). Piracy rates source from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2010). Additional information on measurement could be obtained from BSA (2009) 3 . BSA is an industry group; nevertheless its data on software piracy is the best cross-country measure currently used in the literature, though object of some inherent upward bias. 4 From a broad perspective, the data on software piracy could be viewed as proxying for the extent of digital piracy.
Instrumental variables
In this section, we devote space to providing justification for the empirical validity of the instrumental variables. This justification is essential for the relevance of the empirical analysis because, a theoretical basis for the instruments is imperative for sound and consistent interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, while the object of this article is to assess the income-redistributive effect of piracy, it also indirectly aims to examine how IPRs 
Control variables
Owing constraints in degrees of freedom necessary for the overidentifying restrictions tests, we are unable to control for more than three variables 5 : economic prosperity (GDP growth), inflation and trade.
(1) GDP growth may reduce inequality conditional on evendistribution of the fruits of economic prosperity (Dao, 2009 ). The absence of any significant nexus between GDP growth and income-inequality could confirm growing fears that the relative high growth rates enjoyed by African countries (4.36% in the mean) do not trickle down from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic level. (2) The inflation rate (Bashir, 2002) included to control for the macroeconomic environment could either have a positive or negative sign depending on whether it is high or low. Though inflation has been generally seen to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) owing to decreased purchasing power, low inflation however has a negative incidence on inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004) . (3) Trade can either increase or decrease inequality depending on the proportion of the poor relying on agricultural exports. On the other hand, cheap imports could increase savings and hence improve the income-distribution of the poor. In the same vein, too much imports of 'substitution goods' produced by domestic industries could fuel income-inequality if a great chunk of the population in the lower-income bracket depends on the affected industries for subsistence income. Moreover, imports reduce racial earning inequality by significantly decreasing the wage of low-and medium-skill non-whites (Agesa et al., 2011) .
Owing to constraints in data availability (for piracy rates), the data include annual 
Methodology
Endogeneity
While inequality could be endogenous to piracy, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out, since inequality can also be exogenous to piracy (Andrés, 2006a) . We are therefore confronted here with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality since the piracy indicators are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. To tackle this endogeneity concern, we shall assess its presence with the Hausman test before employing an estimation technique relevant to the outcome of the test.
Estimation technique
Borrowing from recent piracy literature (Andrés & Goel, 2012) , the paper adopts a First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
In Equation 2, X is a set of control variables (trade, GDP growth and inflation 
Empirical analysis
This section aims to examine three main issues: (1) the ability of the instruments to explain the endogenous components of the piracy channel; (2) the capacity of the exogenous components of the piracy channel to explain inequality and; (3) the ability of instruments to explain inequality beyond the piracy channel. While the first issue is addressed with firststage regressions, the second and third concerns are assessed with the 2SLS regressions. Table 2 have no policy implications, as the regressions are simply meant to demonstrate that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous explaining variable of interest. Hence, discussing these to elaborate detail will be space consuming and out of scope. However, it is worth emphasizing that the insignificance of IPRs laws (treaties) on economic prosperity could be due to the documented U-shaped relationship (Briggs, 2010) . 
First stage regressions
Two-stage least squares
This section discusses the second and third issues: the ability of the exogenous components of the piracy channel to explain inequality and, the capacity of the instruments to explain inequality beyond the piracy channel. To inspect these issues, we employ a 2SLS with IPRs laws, education & ICTs and government quality dynamics as instrumental variables.
Whereas the second issue is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, the third is solved with the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, the instruments explain inequality only through the piracy mechanism, conditional on other covariates (control variables). Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain inequality beyond the piracy channels. A Hausman test is performed prior to the 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that, estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent.
Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and hence, lends credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique.
For almost all models under consideration, we find overwhelming evidence of endogeneity (at the 1% significance level) and proceed with the IV estimation.
2SLS with IPRs laws (treaties) instruments
While Panel A of Table 3 presents restricted 2SLS regressions, Panel B reports their unrestricted counterparts (with a constant). The first halves of both panels contain regressions without HAC standard errors while the second halves report estimates robust to HAC standard errors. Like in Table 2 , the asterisk sign (*) denotes regressions with robust HAC standard errors. With regard to the control variables, the following conclusions could be drawn: (1) economic prosperity has no significant redistributive effect on inequality; (2) trade openness has an income disequalizing effect and; (3) inflation has a negative income redistributive effect.
2SLS with Education and ICTs instruments
While Panel A of Table 4 below Table 3 on the pro-poor character of software piracy are confirmed with a different set of instrumental variables in Table 4 . 
2SLS with Good Governance instruments
While Panel A of Restricted and unrestricted regressions (Panel A and Panel B respectively) address the second issue but not the third issue because: (1) the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR is rejected for the most part and; (2) where the null of the Sargan test is not rejected (Model 36(36*)), the adjusted coefficient of determination (R²) has a negative explanatory power.
Though the estimated piracy coefficients have the rights signs in Panel B, rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan test indicates that, government quality instruments do not mitigate inequality only through the piracy channel (conditional on the control variables). In other words, other instruments beside formal institutions are necessary for a pro-poor piracy effect.
These instruments include among others; IPRs laws, education & ICTs used above.
Discussion, policy implications and caveats
Discussion and policy implications
The findings have shown a positive income-redistributive effect for software piracy. In other words, piracy maybe good for the poor. The income equalizing effect of software piracy is a fairly simple phenomenon to understand. Given the high cost of computer software, a great chunk of the population from the lowest income strata cannot afford to buy original software packages. Hence illegal copying, unauthorized downloading and counterfeiting become the only alternative means to obtaining the desired software packages. By purchasing cheap pirated software, computer literates in the lower income strata can save money for other utilities. Hence, an indirect increase in their purchasing power. This interpretation is consistent with the relevance of the hypothesis that, the poor are more prone to using pirated software (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, 1-2) . Moores & Esichaikul have found a strong negative relationship between economic wealth and the level of software piracy, such that poorer countries tend to have higher levels of software piracy. The high cost of software is often cited as a motivating factor for pirating software. At a micro economic level, this explanation lends credit to our findings.
Beside economic considerations, another factor that could elucidate the incomeequalizing effect of piracy in Africa is cultural. It has been firmly established that countries with a more collectivist society also tend to have higher levels of software piracy (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, 2) . High collectivist income groups are usually those at the bottom of the income distribution because, people become more individualistic as they grow richer. Hence, the natural conclusion that sharing and commercialization of cheap pirated software is among the faction of the population making-up the lower income strata. The findings are consistent with a great bulk of the literature that has examined the determinants of the willingness to pirate software (by assessing the socio-economic factors that affect piracy). The conclusion drawn from these studies is that, nations with higher income and greater individualism have lower piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; Rushing & Thompson, 1996 , 1999 Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004) . Our findings concur with the above studies from a microeconomic standpoint.
Our finding has also shed some light on the current debate over IPRs protection. While some are postulating increased protection of IPRs as means of stimulating economic growth and development through the appealing impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006) , others are skeptical and of the position that IPRs protection and adherence to international treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001 ). This latter school of thought is of the view that, less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the short-run) for developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for growth and development. The findings of this paper have reconciled this debate with the bridge that, less tight IPRs regimes in the short-run are good for the poor as they enhance the benefits of knowledge spillovers. However, as income-inequality decreases, the adoption of tighter IPRs regimes will facilitate inflows of FDI and technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996) , stimulate exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and increase the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996) .
The following discussion concerns the control variables in Table 3 . (1) A negative or positive sign was expected from the estimated coefficient of economic prosperity. The absence of any significant nexus between GDP growth and income-inequality confirms growing fears that the relative high growth rates enjoyed by African countries (4.36% in the mean) do not trickle down from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic level. (2) Inflation was also included to control for the macroeconomic environment and was expected to either have a positive or negative sign depending on its rate. Though inflation has been generally seen to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) owing to decreased purchasing power, low inflation however has a negative incidence on inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004) . The relative high inflation rate (6.96% in the mean) confirms the disequalizing income-distribution inflationary effect in the results. (3) The positive incidence of trade openness on inequality has two possible interpretations: on the one hand, the proportion of exports originating from the poor is quite low; on the other hand, cheap imports are stifling the domestic industries on which the poor substantially depend for income.
It is also interesting to discuss some ethical implications of software piracy in Africa.
Inequality could be further mitigated owing to software piracy from four main ethical standpoints: (1) the seller of pirated software thinks (S)he is right to continue her (his) business because the company may incur more expenses taking the matter to court; (2) users of pirated software think it is right to use pirated commodities because they are poor; (3) illegal copying might be based on interpersonal trust as those who either copy or share software with others must trust that the software contains no viruses and; (4) moreover, individuals distributing illegal copies to others must trust these persons not to report to the police.
Caveats
Two main caveats have been retained: limitations in the measurement of software piracy and, the perception based good governance measures that may be subject to substantial bias due to media propaganda.
Firstly, on the measurement of software piracy, three points are relevant (Asongu, 2012c) .
(1) Accordingly, the 'piracy level is computed as the difference in demand for new software applications (computed from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software'. It is worth noting that, this metric defines piracy as the drop in demand of software products.
Hence, all pirated copies constitute lost sales. (2) It has also been substantially documented that, those who buy pirated copies do not always have the money to buy the true commodity.
Hence, to consider the use of pirated products as diminishing demand for originals could be some kind of overstatement. (3) The employment of the metric presupposes knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the original product. Otherwise, there will be a comparison of pirated products that constitute loss in sales with ones that do not. Therefore, there is some upward bias in the software piracy estimate.
Secondly, good governance indicators are perception based measures that may be subject to a considerable degree of media propaganda. This downside has been mitigated with: (1) the use of a broad range of government quality indicators; (2) the use of other IPRs and ICTs (and education) alternative instrumental variables and; (3) the adoption of an endogeneity based estimation approach that accounts for measurement errors and variable collection errors. Ultimately, as far as we have reviewed (Asongu, 2012e) , there are no better government quality indicators than those available in the World Bank Development Indicators.
Conclusion
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to economic and human developments. There is also a growing role of IPRs protection, especially with advances in ICTs. While existing piracy literature has focused on the socio-economic determinants of piracy, but for Andrés (2006a) , the piracy-inequality nexus has remained unexplored. The current paper which steers clear of Andrés (2006a) from three standpoints 6 has had a threefold contribution to the literature. Firstly, as far as we have reviewed, it is the first empirical study to assess the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa. Secondly, the piracy-inequality nexus is contingent on the upholding of IPRs. In other words, it has examined how IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumental in the effect of piracy on incomeinequality. Thirdly, given current efforts that have been devoted to fighting piracy in the continent, the study has also assessed how governance mechanisms are instrumental in the effect of piracy on inequality. The main finding suggests that, software piracy is good for the poor as it has a positive income-redistributive effect. This finding is consistent with recent piracy literature (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011) from both economic and cultural considerations. ICTs & education (dissemination of knowledge) are instrumental in this positive redistributive effect, while good governance mitigates inequality beyond the piracy channel.
As a policy implication, in the adoption tight IPRs regimes, sampled countries should take account of the role less stringent IPRs regimes play on income-redistribution through 6 The present paper has steered clear of Andrés (2006a) from three standpoints: (1) it has focused exclusively on Africa instead of developed-world oriented; (2) IPRs, education & ICTs and good governance instruments have been used to control for endogeneity in the piracy-inequality nexus using an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation approach, contrary to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) employed by Andrés (2006a) and; (3) the incidence of piracy on inequality has been assessed and not the other way round.
software piracy. Collateral benefits include among others, the cheap dissemination of knowledge through ICTs which African countries badly need in their quest to become 'knowledge economies'. A caveat however is that, too much piracy may decrease incentives to innovate. Hence, the need to adopt tighter IPRs regimes in tandem with increasing incomeequality. 
Appendices Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries
